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Abstract: Food production shocks can lead to food crises where access to appropriate quantities and
quality of food become inadequate, unaffordable, or unreliable on a major scale. While the physical
causes of food production shocks are well researched, the dynamics of responses to them are less
well understood. This paper reviews those dynamics and includes evidence gathered via interviews
of 44 expert practitioners sourced globally from academia, government, industry, think-tanks, and
development/relief organizations. The paper confirms that policy interventions are often prioritised
for national interests and poorly coordinated at regional and global scales. The paper acknowledges
future compounding trends such as climate change and demographic shifts and suggests that while
there are signs of incremental progress in better managing the impacts of shock events, coordinated
responses at scale will require a paradigm shift involving major policy, market, and technological
advancements, and a wide range of public and private sector stakeholders.
Keywords: production shock; food crisis; food price; government responses
1. Introduction
The World Economic Forum defines food crises to occur where ‘access to appropriate quantities
and quality of food and nutrition becomes inadequate, unaffordable or unreliable on a major scale’ [1].
Such crises can be regional or global in extent and can result from major shock events. Evidence
suggests that a food crisis cannot simply be avoided by having access to sufficient supplies of food as
the dynamics of supply and demand are increasingly complex in the modern global agrifood system.
For example, Bangladesh experienced severe famine and hunger in the 1970s, not for lack of global
food supply but, instead, local food supply, price increases, and speculative behaviour combined and
resulted in the deaths of up to 1.5 million people [2–5]. At the global level, the most recent major crisis
occurred in 2007/08—termed the ‘world food crisis’ [6]—and resulted in a doubling of international
wheat and maize prices (over two years) and a tripling of international rice prices (over just a few
months) [7]. The World Bank calculated that it forced over 130 million people into poverty [7] and
food import bills of developing countries increased by 56% during 2007/08 [8].
While the adverse effects of the 2007/08 crisis are well known [6,9], there is more speculation
around the relative importance of contributing dynamics to such events. Some authors [10] highlight
that food commodity prices operate in a complex global system, yet remain broadly consistent with
market fundamentals where price is driven by interactions of supply and demand, while others [11]
consider that supply-demand interactions cannot fully explain price spikes. Additionally, prices of
crops are highly correlated now, given that feedstock grains can be substituted, and so a production
shock in one grain can impact the price of another. What emerges from across the literature is that no
one dynamic can solely account for past changes in food prices.
Further to identifying the contributing causes to major shock events, market and government
responses to food production shocks are complex [10–21] and typically not well quantified.
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Past responses have revealed fundamental market and policy failures in the market-based food
architecture [22] and trends suggest that future responses may be complicated by increasingly
interconnected inter-country food dependencies [23] and changes in frequency and severity of extreme
weather events and climatic changes [24].
Hence, there is a need to better understand the before, during, and after of acute food shock
events, which may not only help to manage and avoid such events in the future, but may also reveal
some insights into addressing more chronic food insecurity challenges. This paper, therefore, aims to
explore this lack of understanding with a specific research objective to better capture expert knowledge
that exists in the practitioner community around the likely responses to food production shocks and
their societal impacts. The paper uses expert interviews and critical literature reviews to organize and
validate existing knowledge on food security challenges associated with food shock events.
The paper confirms that agricultural commodity price spikes are a common market reaction to
shock events and that the range of responses from both exporting and importing actors can either
assuage or exacerbate impacts. Actors can act largely independently (in self-interest), meaning that
at regional and global scale, responses can be poorly coordinated. The paper analyses political,
financial, social, and technological factors contributing to actor responses. The paper concludes
that greater coordination and action around global agrifood policies; the balancing of sovereign
rights and national (food) security interests with reliance on global market efficiencies; and climate
change mitigation/adaptation will be required to help ensure that the most vulnerable countries and
communities have access to affordable and quality food during shock events.
2. Materials and Methods
This paper is derived from research conducted as part of the ‘UK-US Taskforce on Extreme
Weather and Global Food System Resilience’, which examined plausible worst case scenarios of
disruption to the global agrifood system caused by extreme weather events. The taskforce developed
a conceptual framework for devising and assessing different hypothetical scenarios of disruption to
the global food supply chain, fixed around two quantitative reference points: (i) reductions to global
crop production; and (ii) resultant consequences for the global food system, such as commodity price.
Further, three sets of drivers for those reference points were developed around (i) climate/weather
events, (ii) market and policy responses, and (iii) impacts in country, to assess different aspects in
disruption pathways. This paper focuses on the ‘response’ driver; specifically, the most plausible and
likely policy and market response pathways, and whether those pathways ameliorate or exacerbate
effects of crop production losses and associated market fluctuations.
This paper draws from primary and secondary qualitative data sources, and secondary
quantitative data sources. A literature review of both practitioner and academic sources preceded
an assessment of typical market impacts based on a structured stakeholder engagement process.
A food risk scenario was developed in partnership with the United Kingdom Met Office, based on the
‘human dynamics of climate change’ food maps [25]. A synthesis of productivity and consumption
databases and assessments of impact of availability on traded commodities (from the World Bank, the
Food and Agricultural Organisation, the United States Department of Agriculture, and the United
Nations ComTrade database) also contributed to construction of the food risk scenario. The food
risk scenario, a human dynamics food map, and semi-structured interview questions were provided
to 44 expert interviewees drawn globally from academia, government, industry, think-tanks, and
development/relief organizations. The questionnaire aimed to understand key stakeholder responses
to food production shocks based on a hypothetical scenario of a 20% shock in one, or all, of the
key traded crops (wheat, maize, rice, soy), with particular focus on factors that could exacerbate
or ameliorate price increases, and export and import capabilities. Interview durations ranged from
30–60 min and were conducted by telephone.
Snowball sampling (also called chain-referral sampling) was employed as a form of
non-probability sampling, which is widely used in qualitative sociological research [26,27]. The method
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requires the identification of an initial set of relevant respondents and then requesting that they suggest
other potential subjects who have relevance to the objective of the study [27]. Snowball sampling
is recommended by some authors [28], in studies such as this one, where there is a requirement for
expert judgement and where access is provided to knowledge or assessments otherwise not available
in the public domain. The authors countered the potential limitations of snowball sampling (such as
respondents suggesting others with similar characteristics and outlooks [29] and challenges in verifying
the eligibility of potential respondents) by actively and deliberately developing and controlling the
sample’s initiation, progress, and termination [26]. This included sampling from multiple ‘entry’ points
from the outset and targeting respondents from different geographical locations (thirteen countries,
including Brazil, Canada, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Mexico, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore,
Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States) and sectors (academia, government,
industry, think-tanks, and development/relief organizations). Further, to maintain construct validity,
rather than aggregating and averaging responses, the authors included the full range of responses
from all interviewees, conducting a manual coding analysis to group the responses according to key
emergent themes [30]. During interviews, the authors adhered to relevant ethical research standards
for United Kingdom universities.
In addition, a final workshop, hosted by the Royal Institute of International Affairs at Chatham
House, brought together eight practitioners to review initial findings and highlight any gaps in
knowledge. Figure 1 shows the countries from where the expert respondents were based.
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Figure 1. Countries from which the expert respondents were based.
The following section presents the main findings from the combined primary (interviews)
and secondary (literatur ) data sources, while the discussion section then highlights t e main
factors, identified through these themes, that interact to shape the dynamics of food production
shock responses.
3. Results
What emerges from the interviews and across the literature is that market and policy responses
to food production shocks are complex, typically not well quantified, and that no one cause can be
attributed solely to past changes in food prices. Here the two main overarching themes are presented as
export or import responses with sub-themes explored within each highlighted the relevant literature or
interview excerpts as appropriate. Export responses are those respon s, including policy, roduction
capacity, and price, which directly impact the export capacity of a p rtic lar c untry with respect to
the supply of food. Import responses are those responses, including policy, price, and distribution,
which directly impact the ability of a particular country to import food from global supply chains.
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3.1. Export Responses
Some authors [10,31] state that a production shock becomes a global supply shock if trade and
export restrictions result. Export responses and agricultural commodity price changes are intrinsically
linked—price changes are a signal that something has happened in the supply system. In response to
price spikes, counteracting forces often come into play as stakeholders act in self-interest to rebalance
supply and demand components. Such forces related to exports may include positive and negative
market and policy responses.
Government preparedness and willingness to act during a shock event are important factors in
determining the severity and extent of the impact. Some authors [22] point to the escalation of export
restrictions by key food exporters in the face of rising food prices in 2007/08 as a reminder of the
deeply political nature of food as a commodity. Shocks at the global level can be minimized, delayed,
or avoided (or alternatively exacerbated and accelerated) by various government actions. Exporting
countries can decide how much of their production will be exported for sale or retained for domestic
consumption. Both individually and collectively, such decisions have important influences on agrifood
commodity prices and availability and can create many winners and losers.
“The food sovereignty debate is more about politics than food security.” Academic Representative,
Asia
Some authors [31] state that trade shocks (related to export restrictions) are one of the great
uncertainties in world food markets. If an exporting government perceives food shortages or price
rises, they may impose export restrictions (and even complete bans) or enforce technical barriers
(such as customs procedures). If there is a concern of increasing price volatility domestically then
governments may also intervene to provide stability to domestic markets (although in doing so this
may raise prices for others). Government-implemented trade restrictions by several countries in
2007/08 caused a ‘run on rice’ [32], with prices tripling. Similar actions in the run up to the 2012 crisis
were purportedly compounded by adverse weather and drought conditions [33]. Some authors [22]
believe that export restrictions undermine trust in the world market as a source of food security.
“Countries need to decide whether they see food as a “globally trade-able commodity” or as a
“strategic national input.” Think Tank Representative, Asia
“It may be better not to restrict exports, but evidence shows that countries that do restrict can benefit
from it.” Academic Representative, Europe
However, only some governments have the capacity and will to impose explicit export restrictions
and it is strongly related to the internal political situation. For example, agricultural markets in Russia,
India, China, and Vietnam are controlled by the state or state-owned enterprises, whereas private
sector actors play a more significant role in countries such as the United States (where an outright
export ban has not been issued since the 1970s). In countries not dominated by state-owned enterprises,
lobby groups can significantly influence government decision-making. Political pressure to protect
domestic interests (e.g., livestock industries, biofuel industries, domestic farmers) may keep domestic
food prices low and, therefore, in democracies, voters happy.
“The literature recommends keeping trade moving, but governments need to keep their own people
happy.” Government Representative, North America
Such reasons for restrictions are witnessed in countries such as Argentina (regularly) and Thailand
(in 2008). Notably, while countries, such as the United States, have chosen not to impose explicit export
restrictions in recent decades, they can use other means to protect their farmers and domestic markets
as necessary. Inflated domestic pricing—the United States domestic wheat price is higher than the
global export price—also encourages satisfaction of the domestic market primarily (a food security
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issue) and export markets secondarily. Similarly, China maintains high domestic prices and high
domestic production levels. Taxes are also able to be levied at national borders to discourage export
(some developing countries regularly do this). However, other countries are sometimes criticized, or
praised, for prioritizing international markets over domestic consumers.
“The Brazilian Government sees itself as a provider of grains to international customers, sometimes
over domestic needs.” NGO Representative, Latin America
“In 2012 in Brazil, in response to production shocks and high commodity prices, in one season
farmers planted soybean and some corn and harvested it early and then squeezed in a second crop
of corn within the same season. Nowadays, two crop harvests in one season is more common. An
exporting country such as Brazil can respond quickly to increases in prices and can self-finance
production increases under those conditions.” Private Sector Representative, North America
Stakeholders, such as the United States Department of Agriculture (and some authors [8,34]),
acknowledge that increases in United States ethanol production, and associated structural changes in
the national maize market, have impacted the world’s supply and demand balance for total coarse
grains [14]. Importantly, some authors attributed increased demand for coarse grains for biofuel
production in the EU and United States as a prominent differentiating factor between the 2007/08
world food crisis and earlier events [35].
“Refusal by the United States to waive biofuel policy, particularly after poor harvests of maize, is a
response by omission rather than commission.” Think Tank Representative, Europe
“To date, biofuel mandates in the United States and Europe have been inflexible and may be
unlikely to change until those exporting countries experience extreme conditions.” Private Sector
Representative, North America
In the literature, there is frequent reference to inter-grain causation between fuel crops and food
crops. For example, some authors [31] describe an increased demand for maize (from biofuels) leading
to a lower supply of soybean (due to land in the US being allocated to maize production over soybean)
and a strong causal link between maize and soybean price shocks. Biofuels accounted for almost
half the increase in consumption of major food crops in 2006–07, mostly due to corn-based ethanol
produced in the United States [36]. Other authors [22] point to the EU (in 2001) and United States (in
2005) legislation increasing the demand for maize to produce ethanol and vegetable oils to produce
biodiesel. Biofuel demand was said to increase prices not only for corn, but for other grains, meat,
poultry, and dairy through cost-push and crop and demand substitution effects [8].
Export restrictions were generally not recommended from a market function and efficiency
viewpoint, however, there were some suggestions that countries that do restrict exports can benefit,
at least initially, particularly in averting the worst effects of a crisis. Furthermore, some supporters
argue that current food security and agricultural policies (for example, global trade agreements) do
not benefit populations worldwide equally and that, under such conditions, export restrictions are
understandable and may be justifiable. However, the dynamic impact of export restrictions and lower
domestic prices for commodities can lead to other challenges, such as lower overall global production
of important crops.
“There is some lack of faith in international trading systems and some shift to self-sufficiency, which
is not open, adaptable or efficient.” Research Institution Representative, North America
An important factor influencing the magnitude of any price rise is the state of world food
commodity stocks at the time of the shock. In general, if world stocks are high, then the magnitude
of increase should be less than if world stocks are low. This also suggests that if multiple shocks
occur—where world stocks are lowered and not given time to rebound—then price rises (and associated
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challenges) may continue to increase after each successive event. Exporting countries suffering from
shock events may or may not have stockpiles that they can draw down to maintain export output.
Where stocks are available, exporting countries may be able to maintain their contractual relationships
with importing partners whilst also providing for their own domestic markets throughout the shock
event. However, formulating policy based on stock levels is difficult due to a lack of data on current
stock levels [37].
“A lack of transparency of food reserves of some major countries means that it is difficult to predict
what their reaction will be under shock scenarios and what impact it will have on global agricultural
commodity markets.” Academic Representative, Europe
Physical and institutional infrastructure can be as important for exporting countries as for
importing countries, not only for domestic food security, but in terms of shifting large volumes
of export stock quickly. While importing countries can often space out their imports in line
with their storage/transport capacities, exporting countries often must shift large volumes quickly
once harvested.
“Impacts of extreme weather event may not be on production, but on something else in the agrifood
system, for example, physical infrastructure, transport networks, food safety, and follow-on impacts
to other industries which contribute to financial markets.” Academic Representative, Europe
Exporting countries, such as the United States, Canada, Australia, Brazil, Argentina, and others
sometimes have problems exporting agricultural commodities due to infrastructure limitations.
For example, the United States transport network from production areas (e.g., the Midwest) to ports
(in the Gulf of Mexico) is highly reliant on the Mississippi River. The Mississippi River is limited as a
transport route due to increased traffic for movement of other commodities (e.g., shale oil, etc.) and
occasional periods of low water levels (such as 2011/12). Countries, such as Canada and Australia,
have experienced rail capacity limitations. Russia is dependent on ports for export, many of which
are prone to freezing over. Other potential difficulties for such countries include different rail gauge
issues, long journeys to sea ports, crowded rail routes, and costly transportation. Export centres can
also become impeded and/or disconnected via conflict, e.g., the Black Sea is a key export point for
agrifood commodities from Ukraine and Russia via the Bosphorus Strait.
“There are long term capacity issues on critical transport routes, such as the Mississippi River and
the Pacific Northwest rail line in the United States. Congestion caused by increasing competition
with other commodities, such as shale oil and coal, and impacts of climate change (reduced water
levels) are important factors.” Think Tank Representative, Europe
In addition to physical infrastructure, institutional and human capacities play significant roles.
For example, Brazil and Argentina have been challenged by labour disputes at key export points,
which can delay deliveries to importing countries. Such strikes may be more likely during critical
times, such as shocks, as unions try to negotiate better conditions for workers.
3.2. Import Responses
Demand for food is changing significantly and by 2050 it is expected that there will be an additional
1 to 3 billion more people to feed [38]. Urbanisation trends and changing dietary trends, particularly
increased demand for meat-based protein, dairy, and processed foods, called ‘nutrition transition’ [39],
constitute two of the greatest chronic social challenges for the global food security. Increasingly, both
developed and emerging countries suffer from lifestyle and diet-related non-communicable diseases
(e.g., obesity, diabetes) with associated healthcare challenges [39,40]. Alongside these long-term
demographic influences on food import trends there exists a whole host of shorter term factors.
Financial speculation in food commodity and futures markets is of particular interest in academic
discussions on the causes of food price spikes [11,13,41], yet its influence remains controversial [42].
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Increases in the futures markets for grains in 2008 and 2011 reflected market sentiment that prices
would continue to rise, which ultimately turned out to be incorrect. Some authors [11] detail how
futures traders can base decisions on past trends rather than new information on market fundamentals,
making it harder to distinguish fundamental changes to price. Subsequent herd behaviour impedes
speculators’ abilities of price discovery. Even with the correct information on market fundamentals,
traders may not intervene to correct prices where they stand to benefit from the resulting commodity
bubble. Speculation can, therefore, amplify price increases. For example, World Bank estimates on the
2008 drought reported that up to 30% of price increases occurred based on anticipated fallout (from
drought impacts and biofuel production on corn crops) rather than the shocks themselves.
“There doesn’t have to be a change (blockage) of trade, but just a perception of it can spike prices.”
Multilateral stakeholder, North America
“Market responses can be inefficient. They can be driven, not by supply shocks, but by incomplete
information and panic.” Private Sector Representative, North America
Some consumers, particularly in rice-consuming countries (such as India and Bangladesh),
purportedly believe that rising food prices are often due to speculative behaviour and/or cartel
influence. It was suggested that often governments do not take such consumer perspectives into
account when devising or revising policies. Furthermore, elements of corruption and speculation were
considered to occur at both national and local scales.
“Some citizens (in some developing countries) believe that when food prices go up, it’s due to
speculative behaviour (cartels).” Academic Representative, Asia
Panic buying in the market may result when there is speculation of changes in prices and
availability, such as when a major exporting country hints at (and/or implements) export restrictions.
This can raise prices and lead to irrational behaviours, or rational, but panicked, behaviours. Panic
buying responses have led recently to some longer-term stock-building of grains in some Middle East
and North Africa (MENA) countries, particularly because of the Arab Spring events.
“Market responses can be inefficient. They can be driven, not by supply shocks, but by incomplete
information and panic.” Private Sector Representative, North America
Where food security at the national level cannot be achieved through domestic production
countries must rely on market purchases. Such purchases require adequate financial capacity to
compete with other importing countries and are reliant on well-functioning agrifood commodity
trading systems. Both of these factors are tested during periods of inflated prices, export restrictions,
and potential panic associated with major production shocks. Under such conditions, countries with
the lowest capacities (insufficient foreign reserves/currency) may be unable to meet the grain demands
of their populations. For example, while wealthy countries have the capacity to pay inflated prices for
agricultural commodities on the open market, some countries—particularly small or medium-sized
developing countries reliant on imports—could be squeezed out and come to rely on assistance from
relief agencies.
“Those countries that suffer most during a shock event are reliant on imports, and furthermore
countries with insufficient foreign reserves are the most vulnerable of those.” Academic
Representative, Asia
Many importing countries rely on strategic food import arrangements. For example, some
countries, such as the UK and Japan, rely on a combination of trade agreements and being able to
purchase on the global market for their food security. Other countries, such as Saudi Arabia and
China, are entering into long-term contracts and, in some cases, purchasing land in land-abundant
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exporting countries (e.g., Saudi Arabia with Sudan), as part of strategic partnerships for security of
supply. In such importing countries, the private sector (and/or state-owned enterprises) is permitted
to act in selected roles, but strategic production is controlled by the government. For many importing
countries, ensuring a diversity of supply country options helps to manage any region-specific or
country-specific production losses. The interconnected nature of inter-country food dependence has
increased dramatically over recent decades [23].
“Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) have the capacity to encourage stable and strong agreements between
the trading countries, but could sideline poorer countries without FTAs during shocks as there is less
‘free’ capacity of stock available for them to purchase.” Government Representative, Australasia
Transportation of commodities may be exposed and vulnerable to major weather- or
conflict-related events via shipping lanes and ports, and some key ‘choke’ points for global shipping
exist. For example, the Suez and Panama canals and the Malacca Strait in the China Sea are considered
major importing and exporting bottlenecks. An estimated 80% of traded rice and most of China’s
soybean imports are transported via the South China Sea, a route that has a non-trivial risk of naval
conflict. In the MENA region, most imports must pass through at least one, and up to three, maritime
chokepoints, depending on the origin, route, and destination.
“If conflict- or weather-related shocks make the Suez Canal impassable, this would significantly
affect the importing capabilities and food security of Middle East countries.” Research Institution
Representative, North America
For moving commodities within a country, there is a need for effective public distribution systems
to transport imported food products (for example, from coastal port areas) to areas of demand [43].
For large countries with significant intra-national trade, such as Russia, India, and China, these internal
transportation routes are critical to transport grain products from areas of food surplus to areas of food
deficit and operate at varying levels of efficiency, reliability, and resilience to infrastructure compromise.
Beyond infrastructure to move food products, infrastructure to store them also influences responses
to shocks. While technologies for bagging grains have improved and silos can be relatively easily
constructed, spoilage of products still occurs and storage can be costly.
“If we’re worried about food security, then Africa seems to be the most at risk in terms of
infrastructure deficiencies.” Academic Representative, North America
In response to shock events, periodically countries can alter agricultural trade and tax policies—in
particular grain import tariffs—to help stabilise their economies. For example, many countries [22]
altered their grain import tariffs during the 2007/08 world food crisis, which purportedly helped to
reduce the most adverse consequences. However, the same author describes universal food subsidies
as ‘costly, regressive, and, once installed, typically hard to remove, jeopardizing future fiscal stability’.
International food relief agencies, such as the World Food Programme (WFP), can provide immediate
food aid to countries in need, but it does require the cooperation of the recipient country and the
necessary infrastructure for distribution. However, food relief can be prone to its own challenges.
Issues, such as disorganisation, lack of capacity, bribery, and different food standards/quarantine
regulations between countries compromised delivery of the food aid via both ship and overland.
“Harmonised institutional factors would help reduce import impediments during crisis.” Academic
Representative, Europe
Some countries with self-imposed import restrictions may relax them as a temporary coping
strategy during periods of shortage caused by shock events. For example, while GM crops were
introduced globally in 1996, very few GM products are available in Europe or Africa, as a result
of conscious policies to restrict them. Such policies could be tested during major shock events.
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Similarly, the implementation and/or alteration of import subsidies may help to partially insulate
domestic markets from international price increases. Evidence from some countries implementing
major import subsidies within a six to twelve-month period of a shock suggests that they can mitigate
short-term impacts, but can also lead to unintended consequences, such as cross-border smuggling
and major affordability challenges for governments to maintain them, and major political challenges
for governments to reverse them.
“Governments, such as some in the Middle East, have altered import subsidies in recent years in
response to price spikes.” Think Tank Representative, Europe
4. Discussion
Here the findings are drawn together against the main factors that may interact to form future
trends within food production shocks, namely political, financial, social, and technological issues.
Table 1 provides a summary.
Table 1. Summary of main findings from the interviews.
Factors Identified Example Issues
Political
• National politics is key
• Data is not accurate
• International trade and climate policies difficult to agree
Financial
• Food and biofuel subsidies
• Market speculation
• Market integration
Social • Impacts on vulnerable communities• Social safety nets
Technological
• Global supply chain management and technology change
(refrigeration and transportation)
• Tracing and accountability
• Agri-technology development
4.1. Political Factors
Strong sentiment emerged from the interviews, and supported by some authors [22], of the largely
uncoordinated responses by countries to shock events, each driven by internal political dynamics and
national self-interests. This emphasizes the political nature of food as a commodity. In addressing this
current lack of coordination, greater political attention—via forums, such as the G20—needs to be given
to global food security and the increasing risk posed by extreme weather events on global stability.
More reliable information about the state of supplies and stocks could help guard against
inaccurate perceptions of shortages. For example, initiatives such as the Agriculture Market
Information System (AMIS), which has emerged from the G20, provides opportunity for greater
political leadership based on information and transparency. However, some interviewed argued
for an independent global intelligence unit, similar to the role that the International Energy Agency
(IEA) plays for public and private petroleum stocks [44]. Some commentators were pessimistic about
achieving political agreement on either a global trading system or effective climate policy.
4.2. Financial Factors
Some authors [34] call for major reforms around financial subsidies for crops for energy,
specifically ethanol in the United States. Additionally, many commentators call for reductions of
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subsidies for locally-produced crops in regions such as the EU that prevent more efficient crop
production from alternative potential exporting nations in regions such as Africa.
There may also be opportunity to better monitor market speculation and commodity trading to
provide more predictability, particularly during shock events. Minimising information asymmetry may
help prevent unnecessary panic and traders from exploiting price runs. While the EU common regional
market has existed in its broad current form for two decades, and has faced significant challenges to
its unity recently, other common regional markets, such as in Asia, are considered likely to emerge at
some point.
4.3. Social Factors
Acute shock events can pose severe challenges for vulnerable communities. For example,
malnutrition among pre-schoolers rose during the 2007/08 world food crisis, forcing some children to
drop out of school early and rendering the damage long lasting [22]. Additionally, by November 2008,
food riots had occurred in some 30 countries as a result of the 2007/08 world food crisis [34].
Increasingly, the urban poor, without the capacity to revert to subsistence farming (and, hence,
reliant on purchasing) and barring government controls to shelter them from global market fluctuations,
may be the most exposed to shock events and elevated international food prices. Effective and reliable
social safety nets will be required to support the neediest.
4.4. Technological Factors
There has been a radical shift in power from local growers to international retailers and consumers
shaping what and how food products are grown, processed and sold [39]. Global supply chains
are complex, include high levels of refrigeration and there is a trend towards processed foods.
Advancements in supply chains should focus on increasing resilience and robustness, improving
efficiencies, and reducing wastage and having the ability to remote monitor and trace from source
to customer.
A combination of technological innovations and management initiatives (e.g., restoration of
degraded lands back into production) will need to be driven at scale to shift onto a sustainable
agrifood development pathway. Opportunities to increase production whilst minimising emissions
from agriculture, as well as focusing on intensification rather than extensification, lie in modern
approaches, such as conservation agriculture.
5. Conclusions
Evidence from past shock events shows that agricultural commodity price spikes are a common
market response. This paper has reviewed the roles and responses of exporting and importing
stakeholders and has demonstrated that there are several actions that they can take in response to
shock events that can either assuage or exacerbate impacts. Through a set of expert interviews the paper
has been able to organize and highlight the key underlying issues relating to global food security, and
while it has not led to a new contribution to theory it, nevertheless, provides this important validation.
It is likely that such extreme events will continue to increase in frequency and, hence, the degree of
resilience and ability to adapt and respond to those events will determine their impacts on communities.
Importantly, action is required to better coordinate political responses, manage financial responses,
and invest in social and technological solutions.
Hence, in the interests of reducing the likelihood and adverse impacts of shock events, there
is strong impetus for action on climate change mitigation and adaptation, and for improved global
agrifood policies on key components of transparency, information sharing, collaboration, and crisis
prevention. Reconciling sovereign rights and national (food) security interests with reliance on global
market efficiencies will take further negotiation. Ensuring access to affordable and quality food for
the most vulnerable countries and the most vulnerable communities, even during shock events, is a
benchmark worth aiming for.
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While there are signs of incremental progress, to have an impact at scale will require a paradigm
shift involving major policy, market, and technological advancements, with contributions from a wide
range of public and private sector stakeholders.
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